Assessing the risk of malevolent attacks against largescale critical infrastructures requires modifications to existing methodologies. Existing risk assessment methodologies consider physical security and cyber security separately. As such, they do not accurately model attacks that involve defeating both physical protection and cyber protection elements (e.g., hackers turning off alarm systems prior to forced entry). Previous research has developed a risk assessment methodology that accounts for both physical and cyber security, while preserving the traditional security paradigm ofdetect, delay and respond and accounting for the possibility that a facility may be able to recover from or mitigate the results ofa successful attack before serious consequences occur. This research is focused on evidence-based techniques (which are a generalization of probability theory) for evaluating the security posture of the cyber protection systems typically found in critical infrastructure facilities. It presents category-based approaches to characterizing both cyber threats and security primitives such as authentication and network access control. A path-based approach is then used wherein various security primitives protect each link (e.g., attack step) in a given path. The end goal is to evaluate the conditional risk that a given adversary category can traverse an attack path and thereby cause a given consequence of concern. This paper's examples focus on cyber-based attackpaths.
INTRODUCTION
Protecting critical infrastructure facilities against malevolent attacks is a major challenge for the operators of those facilities. Most of the critical infrastructures of interest are used to deliver some commodity (water, power, gas, etc.) to an end user. An infrastructure facility comprises "assets" that must operate properly in order for the facility to perform its intended function. The facilities include commodity delivery assets (pumps, valves, transformers, etc.) and cyber elements that can control setpoints, actuation, or other operating functions for the commodity delivery assets. The facilities will have some form of physical protection (fences, locks, alarm systems, etc.) and some form of cyber protection (firewalls, administrative access controls, etc.). Some of the physical protection system (PPS) elements may be controlled or monitored by cyber means. This paper will use water utilities and their typical assets as an example.
Previous research [1] has developed a risk assessment methodology for combined physical and cyber attacks against critical infrastructure facilities. A general construct was developed to combine information about the consequences of concern for the facility under assessment, the asset failures that could lead to those consequences, the capabilities of the adversary attacking the facility, and the protective features present at the facility in order to produce risk estimates. The vulnerability assessment portion of that model made use of existing PPS effectiveness assessment tools [4] but adjusted the performance of physical protection elements that were cyber controlled in order to account for the likelihood that an attacker could penetrate the cyber protection elements of the system. This paper describes a Cyber Protection System (CPS) assessment approach that supports vulnerability estimates for attacks that include cyber elements. In conjunction with the techniques presented in [1] , it provides a quantitative way to jointly evaluate systems that contain both CPS and PPS elements. This CPS assessment approach is similar to past work on attack trees and attack graphs [2, 3 ] . However, the evidence-based approach better captures the uncertainty in the user inputs to the CPS assessment, and hence in the conditional risk estimates for the overall cyber/physical protection system.
ADVERSARY THREAT CATEGORIES
In the physical-security literature, the physical-attack capabilities are often sorted into four broad categoriesnamely hand-tools, power-tools, explosives and vehicles. The susceptibility of various physical protection systems (e.g., doors, locks and fences) to these four physical attack categories has been well quantified in experimental programs [4] . For example, power tools and explosives can damage the state of a physical asset or facilitate entry through locked doors.
There has been considerably less work done to quantify cyber adversaries and their impact on cyber protection systems. For this ongoing research, the cyber-attack capabilities were based on the following seven previously developed attributes [5] . This paper then sorts the potential cyber adversaries in this application domain into the six categories shown in Table 1 
Weeks One SECURITY PRIMITIVES The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms [6] defines information assurance as protecting and defending information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. This research used a slightly different set of security technology primitives, which included the encryption, integrity checking, data-aging protection, authentication, access control, monitoring, and system management primitives. These primitives were derived from Stamp [7] , and will be used to model the cyber security barriers between cyber locations at commodity delivery infrastructure facilities. (Note: another set of security primitives is [8] .) This research then employed the help of security guidelines from the Network Reliability & Interoperability Council (NRIC) [9] and the National Security Agency (NSA) [10] to quantify various "categories" for each security primitive. This paper's example focused on the authentication, network access control, and user access control security primitives.
Authentication
Authentication is concerned with assuring that a person is who they say they are. Authentication can be implemented through the use of passwords. In that case, authentication has the following three basic elements in a typical commodity delivery infrastructure facility -namely the: a) length / type / character-set of password; b) change frequency; and c) limitation of login attempts.
When using passwords, it is good practice to use strong passwords [9] . Currently, a strong password is 12 or more characters in length on Windows systems and at least 8 characters on a UNIX system. It includes upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters. It also does not consist of dictionary words. Finally, it is not found in a list of easily guessed or cracked passwords. (Note: Administrators should obtain and run passwordguessing programs frequently to identify those users that have easily guessed passwords.) Strong passwords are not enough. These passwords need to be changed regularly (i.e. every 30 to 90 days), and the number of failed password attempts needs to be limited [10] .
Network Access Control
Network access control is the ability to limit and control access to systems via communication links. To implement access control, it is recommended that a segmented or partitioned network architecture be implemented. More specifically, where practical, it is suggested that user traffic networks, network-management infrastructure networks, customer-transaction system networks, and enterprise communication/business operations networks be separated and partitioned [9] . Network access control has the following basic elements in a typical commodity-delivery infrastructure facility:
* Traffic filtering device (e.g., a firewall). Those services that are not explicitly permitted by the site's security policy are prohibited, and hence blocked at the firewall [10] . User access control contains the following elements: a) physical protection of the system; b) access control policy (e.g., "how are the user-rights administered?"); and c) the type of software used to implement access control.
In terms of user access control, it is good practice to implement "least privilege" [9] . Least privilege means users should only be given access to the data and services required to do their job [10] .
"Privilege escalation" is an important attack path. It is often easier for an adversary to compromise a user account and then obtain root/administrator privileges then it is for that adversary to directly compromise an administrator account. (Note: This applies to both user accounts and general-purpose accounts such as network printers.)
CYBER SECURITY POSTURES
The previously referenced best practices and guidelines [9, 10] The difference between rights assigned to "individual users"~vs. "groups" is the notion of "role-based access control (RBAC)". With RBAC, essential system roles are clearly defined. Each user is then assigned one, or more, system roles. Each role is given the "least privilege" necessary to accomplish its job function. This approach makes it easier to audit user privileges than the assignment of system rights on a per-individual basis. (Note: based on Ref. 5, the adversary levels in Table 1 were defined with Category I as the highest level adversary. The security primitives in Table 2 -Table 4 were defined with Category I as the lowest level of security.)
COMPARISON OF ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES WITH SECURITY PRIMITIVES This section uses Belief Theory to compare the categories for the cyber security postures and the adversary characteristics. The end goal is to quantify the "belief' that a given adversary category can defeat a given cyber security posture category for a given security primitive. (Note: Appendix A gives a brief overview of belief and evidence which is a generalization of probability.) This approach better captures the uncertainty in the conditional risk estimates than traditional probabilistic approaches that use "point estimates" for the comparison of the adversary and the security primitives.
The adversary's capabilities (against each security primitive) must be compared with the instantiation of that security primitive on a given virtual link. In each table in this section, each variable (for which degrees of evidence are assigned) can be physically interpreted as: "the probability (objective, frequency) that the adversary with the stated capabilities can defeat the associated security primitive of the indicated level".
If the intervals to which degrees of evidence are assigned are points then the belief measure is a probability measure. If only one point has a degree of evidence of 1.0 then there is no uncertainty in that belief. Within each box in a given table, the notation is that a given interval [a,b) has a degree of evidence value of X; we can then calculate belief and plausibility from the degrees of evidence. The "[" and "(" symbols have the standard meaning in set theory.
Authentication
In Table 5 the level of physical access is a key discriminating factor. If the adversary has high or medium access and a long implementation time, then a subverted insider is likely to disclose their own password or find another user's password.
Hence, Category 1-111 adversaries are hard to deter with password-based authentication systems. The cyber skills are a secondary discriminating factor between Category IV -VI adversaries. A high level of cyber skills is required to break strong passwords that are changed infrequently. Finally, all adversary levels can break weak passwords that seldom change.
The values in Table 5 were generated as follows: For example in row IV, column III, the evidence is equally spread amongst the intervals that represent "low", "medium" and "high". Network Access Control
In User Access Control Table 7 2) The performance of the other Threat Categories against UAC Category I is based mainly on their physical access with their cyber skills and implementation time being secondary factors.
3) The performance against UAC categories II and III then more heavily weights the evidence towards adversaries who medium/high physical access and medium/high cyber skills. EXAMPLE Figure 1 shows a very simple example network where not all links implement all three security primitives, which may be a typical case for commodity delivery facilities.) (Note: Appendix A provides a brief tutorial on the Theory of Evidence, and also provides the equations used to calculate the values in Table 8 .)
In this example, the links 1-2 and 1-3 might be links from an external Cyber Access Point (Node 1) such as the Internet to an internal network (Node 2) and a business partner (Node 3) since those two links implement the Authentication (A) and Network Access Control (N) security primitives. The link from the business partner to the internal network (3-2) might have Network Access Control and User Access Control (U), but weaker Authentication requirements than the direct link from the external Cyber Access Point. Node 4 might then be a host on the internal network that can cause a Consequence of Concern. From a trusted network (e.g., Node 2) only Authentication and User Access Control are implemented, while Network Access Control is added for connections that come directly from an un-trusted network (e.g., Node 3). So, this example is a simple example of how weaker security at a business partner can weaken the cyber security posture for a commodity delivery infrastructure. Table 8 shows the evidence that this network's cyber security posture will be effective against the threat categories defined in Table 1 . This simple example is qualitatively correct since it shows that the network would likely not withstand a highly-skilled adversary (e.g, Threat Category I). However, it would be reasonably effective against lower-level adversaries (e.g, Threat Categories IV-VI) who have poor physical access. For the mediumskilled adversaries, the proposed analysis technique allows an analyst to play "what if' games that complement "best practices reviews" and red-teaming exercises.
The values in Table 8 can be calculated by convolution of terms or by combining the expected values for terms if the variables are noninteracting (independent) variables. An example of the latter technique is as follows. The expected value interval for adversary success for each security primitive can be calculated using equation 3 in Appendix A with the data from Tables 5, 6 , and 7. The expected value interval for adversary success for each path segment is the product of the expected value intervals of all the security primitives on that segment. The expected value interval for adversary success for a path is then the product of the expected value intervals for each path segment. System effectiveness for a path (probability adversary is detected) is one minus the expected value interval of the overall probability of adversary success. The path with the lowest midpoint value of its expected value interval for system effectiveness is then deemed the "weakest path".
Using the data from Table 5 Table 8 . This simple example shows the tradeoffs between business necessity (e.g., the business partner may need access to the internal network for maintenance reasons) and security. For the lower-level adversaries, they need to come in through the business partner's network (1-3-2-4). For the mid-level adversaries, they can defeat the protections for the service provider's business network (1-2-4). Finally, the highest-level adversary can penetrate the internal network directly after the subverting the business partner's network (1-3-4) .
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK This paper outlined a quantitative method for evaluating the effectiveness of Cyber Protective Systems (CPS). It gave an example of that method's use in a simple example network. A quantitative method for evaluating CPS was needed for the joint evaluation of PPS and CPS effectiveness against "blended attacks" that combined both cyber and physical attack steps. Previous research [1] described how this paper's proposed techniques for evaluating CPS could be combined with existing PPS evaluation techniques to determine the conditional risk that an adversary could cause a given consequence of concern. Additional research is needed to validate this proposed approach in various applications including large complex networks. APPENDIX A: BELIEF AND EVIDENCE The belief measure of uncertainty is a generalization of the probability measure of uncertainty [ 1 1] . When the uncertainty is of a certain type, strife (which is related to aleatory or random uncertainty), belief becomes probability. However many real world problems have uncertainty of the type called "non-specificity" (which is related to state of knowledge uncertainty) for which the fidelity of the information available is insufficient to justify a probability metric for uncertainty.
For "probability", a likelihood measure is assigned to each possible value, specifically each element of the sample space. For "belief' a likelihood measure is assigned to collections of possible values, specifically subsets of the sample space.
For example, consider a problem where a missing report is known to be in one of a set of 35 boxes in an office. The sample space for this problem is X = {b1, b2, ..., b35} where b represents a box. With no more information, there is total ignorance as to how to assign a likelihood measure to each box, yet the use of probability requires an assignment of likelihood to each box and all these likelihoods must sum to 1.0. To use the probability metric, an assumption must be made about the likelihood of the report being in each box; a typical assumption is that the report is equally likely to be in each box so each box is assigned a probability of 1/35. Since this approach requires an assumption beyond that provided by the evidence, a more general measure of likelihood assigns evidence only that the report is somewhere in the entire set of 35 boxes; that is, a likelihood of 1.0 is assigned to the entire set of 35 boxes.
Vagueness is the other type of uncertainty not addressed by probability. Vagueness addresses uncertainty as to how we categorize known information. For example, assume we know with certainty which box the report is in and we are asked whether or not that box is toward the center of the room. "Boxes toward the center of the room" is a subset (event) of the sample space for all boxes, but there is uncertainty (vagueness) as to the degree of membership of some of the boxes in the subset of interest. Boxes in the corners of the room are not members of the subset "Boxes toward the center of the room", and boxes in the center of the room are members of the subset "Boxes toward the center of the room". But boxes neither in the corners nor in the center are "sort of in the center of the room" and thus have partial membership in the subset "Boxes toward the center of the room", where the membership increases from 0 to 1 as the box location progresses from a corner toward the center.
To be more precise, let X represent a random variable and let A be a subset of X. A is also called an event for the random variable. The elements of X are unique values (mutually exclusive). In general events are not mutually exclusive, since subsets of X can have common elements.
The random variable will have one outcome, but there is uncertainty as to which outcome will occur. This type of uncertainty is called "Ambiguity". A measure of ambiguity is called a "fuzzy measure" in the literature.
Belief
The most general fuzzy measure of interest for this methodology is "Belief' which can be explained by considering degrees of evidence assigned to the elements of Pow(X). Let m denote a "degree of evidence" that is The elements of Pow(X) for which m is greater than 0 are called the "focal elements" of X. The focal elements of X are the subsets (events) of X on which the evidence focuses.
In terms of degrees of evidence, Belief (Bel) and its dual fuzzy measure Plausibility (P1) are defined as follows for any A and B in Pow(X):
Bel(A) = E m(B) BIB where Ai is an element of Pow(X) and m is a degree of evidence.
Probability is a special case of Belief. If the focal elements are singletons, then both Belief and Plausibility reduce to a common fuzzy measure, Probability. A probability metric assigns a degree of evidence to the elements of X (the singletons of Pow(X)), and the degree of evidence for an element, m, is called the probability, p, of the element. The degrees of evidence (probabilities) sum to 1.0. Probability is a special case of Belief/Plausibility where there is no non-specificity. Probability considers Strife but does not consider nonspecificity, so it is an inappropriate measure of uncertainty where there is significant non-specificity. 
